Tuesday, March 22, 2011

ESM / EFSF: An Inverted Capital Structure

I've been meaning to write about this for quite some time, but it's been really hard to have the time to sit down and do it. I've let perfect be the enemy of good and so here I'll try to lay out a rough sketch of what I think are some of the possible risks of the EFSF / ESM.

From Reuters:
The euro zone's permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism ... which will have an effective lending capacity of 500 billion euros, will be backed by 80 billion euros of paid-in capital and 620 billion euros of callable capital ... It will offer loans at funding costs plus 200 basis points for loans up to three years and plus another 100 basis points for loans longer than three years.
What you are seeing here is what Michael Pettis described as an "inverted" capital structure in his excellent book, The Volatility Machine. What that means is that there is positive correlation between the need for funds, the cost of funds and the credit quality of the facility. This is problematic because it could cause reflexive price action in the bonds of the aid recipients, lowering the value of the EFSF holdings and furthermore deteriorating its perceived credit quality. This is also sometimes referred to as "wrong-way risk" when talking about CCPs. In other words, "the risk that different risk factors be correlated in the most harmful direction." AKA a vicious cycle.

Here's some numbers from the June 7, 2010 EFSF execution agreement. They represent the subscription amount and percentage to the EFSF.  The EFSF is just a legal entity where various countries contribute capital and become equity holders (with unlimited liability). The contributed capital and proceeds from bond issuance are used to make loans to countries that need aid. The bonds are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the EFSF, the EFSF equity holders (EUM member states), the EU, and have the EFSF holdings as collateral. The table below is a breakdown of the contributed capital so far. Issued debt is to be overcollateralized at a rate of no less than 120% by AAA Holdings and AAA guarantees. There is also to be a cash reserve that equals the NPV of the margin of the EFSF loan and service fee. The EFSF is available to all EMU member states.

ECB Member State Capital subscription Contribution Key %
Kingdom of Belgium 2.4256 3,475494866853410%
Federal Republic of Germany 18.9373 27,134106588911300%
Ireland 1.1107 1,591454546757130%
Kingdom of Spain 8.3040 11,898297070560200%
French Republic 14.2212 20,376693436879900%
Italian Republic 12.4966 17,905618879089900%
Republic of Cyprus 0.1369 0,196155692312101%
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 0.1747 0,250317015682425%
Republic of Malta 0.0632 0,090555440132394%
Kingdom of the Netherlands 3.9882 5,714449467342010%
Republic of Austria 1.9417 2,782143957358700%
Portuguese Republic 1.7504 2,508041810249100%
Republic of Slovenia 0.3288 0,471117542967267%
Slovak Republic 0.6934 0,993530730819656%
Republic of Finland 1.2539 1,796637126297610%
Hellenic Republic 1.9649 2,815385827787050%
Total 67.8266 100,000000000000000% 

Where is the risk? Well, the risk here is that everyone is guaranteeing everyone. So, if Ireland Portugal and Greece need aid, their guarantee is pretty much worthless, and they are now users of the fund. If another state were to need aid, another piece of the guarantee would become worthless and need for funds would increase. This would increase the cost of funds, which would be passed on to aid receivers. Unless the states receiving aid are running a budget surplus, this would translate to increasing borrowing needs to cover additional debt service costs, furthermore deteriorating their quality.

Of course, losing Portugal's guarantee is unlikely to be disastrous, but if Belgium and Spain were to find themselves in trouble too, that would put additional pressure on the remaining members, affecting their own credit quality. While it might be no more than an inconvenience to Germany or France, it could adversely affect smaller economies. It could, in essence, leave France Germany and Italy holding the collective bag. I have no clue as to the probability of this happening, but the risk is present and shouldn't just be ignored. If we were to think of bonds as way deep out-of-the-money options (this model goes beyond of the scope of this post), you would notice that you are basically short a lot of gamma here. As the situation deteriorates, the speed at which it deteriorates increases. Of course there is the possibility that it will all work out, which is what the EU is banking on.

I'm not going to get into the gritty part of of this until I have more time, but I think the best way to think about it is as a highly-levered, short way-out-of-the-money put on the EU sovereigns. The probability of going into moneyness might be remote, but the damage in that case would be catastrophic. Buy the paper at your own risk.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

Economic Implications of the Japanese Earthquake & Tsunami

I'd like to start this post by point out I am not a macroeconomist. I did obtain a B.S. in Economics from Northeastern University, but my transcript is anything but impressive. Please question everything I say here and if you see any flaws in my logic be sure to point them out to me in the comments.

The first reaction I saw in the twitter finance / economics crowd was that, while the destruction was very tragic, reconstruction would act as Keynesian stimulus, possibly helping the economy. Some even joked that the combination of increased demand and stimulus in ZIR environment could cause hyper-inflation. So, let's try to step through this piece by piece:

There was massive destruction of the capital stock of Japan. This helps nobody, we are all collectively poorer as a result. There is simply less goods in the world now than there was a week ago. The same can be said for wars. The economic damage to Japan is likely humongous, but that's partly because Japan is a very wealthy country.

Replacement of the damaged capital stock will likely take years, but certain things will be replaced quicker than others, like insured cars, homes, household staples and durables. This sudden replacement will goose demand in the short term, providing stimulus to the economy, putting people to work and utilizing capacity.

A large part of the money for cleanup, reconstruction and replacement will come from exposed insurers and re-insurers. These companies will pay out claims from their assets. Some of the claims will be paid out from their most liquid assets, like cash and cash-equivalents or highly liquid instruments, including but not limited to, sovereign paper. If there is need for additional liquidity to pay out claims, other assets will have to be liquidated. I am no insurance expert, but common sense would dictate that insurers would be likely to liquidate the most liquid and least risky assets first, and then gradually adjust their risk and liquidity exposure in order to avoid paying too much for liquidity or having to take unfavorable bids (I started writing this before the TSE opened, but as of now the JPYUSD has already hit 80.80 and the Nikkei was almost 200pts down).

The initial move up in the Yen is hardly surprising. However, repatriated currency and any carry unwind help support JGBs, especially the front of the curve. Additional liquidity provided by BoJ does the same (Y7T and counting). As supply is set to increase there will be a firm bid for safe haven assets. Risk assets will have it more difficult, especially until losses are sorted out, especially financials.

Overall, this will essentially be bearish for JGBs in the long term. The economy's Supply capacity was just reduced (S curve moves left) and demand is about to be goosed (D curve moves right). Because of increased demand and reduced supply, I'd expect to see price increases. I'm not talking about price gouging, but pricing power is moving to suppliers, both of goods and of labor. Whether this will be enough to shock the country out of the deflationary trap remains to be seen, though.   If it does succeed, the natural thing to expect would be a gradual uptick in nominal rates, which would be bearish for JGBs in Yen terms. The currency is a different matter.

At first, as we are seeing already, JPY is going to be strong. JPY is a flight-to-quality  currency and a carry funding currency. Any unwind of carry will come with demand for Yen and supply of the carry currency, putting upward pressure in the Yen. The carry trade is so big that there's no way in hell BoJ can do anything about it. After this, though. I see a bearish path for the JPY. What you are going to inevitably end up with is an increasingly indebted country and a reduced capital stock.  Best case scenario the crisis kickstarts the economy and deflation ends, but--again, in the long term--inflation will be bearish for the currency from a PPP standpoint.

PS: anyone telling you that the flight-to-quality is going to lower exports is in the wrong time frame. Techinically, yeah, a strong JPY would hurt exporters, but there's about to be such a HUGE boost to internal demand, that it ain't no thang.

For those of you that like to play, here's some long ideas. (no short ideas because if you short disaster victims you're a real asshole)
Managed timber; Durables and materials retailers; Equipment sales and leases; Construction; Auto dealerships; furniture retailers; electronics (TVs, computers, etc retailers). Basically go long the people who are going to sell the stuff that needs to be replaced and were either undamaged or probably protected by insurance. Also, anyone that rents out heavy machinery.

Thursday, January 27, 2011

Technically speaking: A setup for selling $PG Feb 18 2011 62.50 PUTs


Watch the next few hours in $PG trading. The Feb 18 62.50 PUTs sold at this morning for up to $0.40. If we see the day turning for the worst, I'd say this would be a nice trade if you are looking for some delta-positive exposure. Will PG fall and hit it's trendline again? Maybe, but the general updraft is powerful and I wouldn't put my money on the short side. Plus, we have GDP numbers tomorrow and, uncharacteristically, I'll take the over on the 3.5 estimate. If you are expecting GDP numbers to disappoint, you might want to wait.


Disclosure:
No position yet, but if I can get a good price, I'm looking to sell those PUTs.

Wednesday, January 26, 2011

Just a small note on $NFLX and growth rates

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the average household size is 2.6 people and the total US population is about 312,000,000, which gives us an approximate 120,000,000 households. If Netflix (NFLX) has 20,000,000 subscribers that is one-sixth of the households in the US. One-sixth might not seem like much, but take in mind only about 58% of American households get cable and Canada only has like 13M households.

According to this Arstechnica post, the U.S. has about a 60% broadband penetration rate. According to PEW Internet, this is closer to 66%. That gives us a total target market of 79.2 million households for "watch instantly", of which Netflix already captures 25%. While broadband penetration is likely to continue increasing, and so is the population, I would think that eventually their growth is becoming seriously limited in the U.S. While netflix does have some tailwinds in it's favor--like computer processing power getting cheaper and cheaper every year--barring signs of international expansion (outside of it's recent entrance into Canada), it seems to me like the growth rates like we've seen in the past will soon be history.

Let's look at what ValueLine has to say on growth rates:

OK, so revenues can grow from increasing prices, buuuuut, I feel like everyone I know with Netflix is actually downgrading it since "watch instantly" is generally good enough and the whole mail thing for newer titles just does not appeal to the instant gratification we want. We can just rent it from iTunes!

But, seriously, assuming no further price hikes and stable revenue-per-subscriber, we are talking about a tripling in the subscriber base to 60M. You may be thinking that's totally doable, but take in mind iTunes and Hulu are becoming real competitors, oh, and there's also that Cable TV thing...

I mean, if you want to buy the stock, whatever, I don't care, just keep in mind that fantastical growth rates are  not going to continue forever, at least not without international expansion. If you are buying NFLX betting pretty soon people in Europe, and Australia are all going to be watching Netflix, that's cool, just remember that outside of the rich first world, demand is likely to be very limited. Oh, remember that even if competitors eat Netflix's dust, you can bet your ass content providers will keep on trying to squeeze every dime they can out of Netflix, so keep an eye out for some compression in that net margin.

I mean NFLX is cool, it's one of my favorite services and I've been a paying member since it's first year of existence, but at the end of the day, it's just a content delivery method. Just like Hulu or cable or the FiOS TV service. The comparative advantage in the company lies in their recommendations and ratings database. Right now, they are using it as a way of keeping people from switching--nobody wants to lose all their ratings--but that's not a good long-term strategy. That data is a marketing and targeted recommendation wet dream and I'd love to see them find a way to monetize that. Amazon and Apple seem like the perfect candidates for that, as they would get the biggest benefit out of being able to deliver higher-quality targeted recommendations, but they are also competitors in the space, so I foresee no friendly cooperation in that space. If , however, Netflix suffers a sharp correction, I wouldn't at all be surprised to see an acquisition taking place.

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Unemployed workers with no unemployment insurance

Click image for hi-res version
Blue is percentage workers receiving unemployment benefits and red is the national civilian unemployment rate. Green line is the percentage of unemployed workers minus the percentage of workers receiving unemployment benefits (red - blue).

Saturday, December 25, 2010

This crisis that looks like that crisis

I was spending my morning reading when I came across the following passage. See if you can guess what countries it is referring to and then scroll down to the bottom (after the jump) to see the answer.
The [debtors] argued that the collapse was proof enough ... that for them to pay the amount owed was impossible. The [creditors], by contrast,  saw the collapse as the evidence of capital flight ... How could it claim to be bankrupt when so many rich [debtors] seemed to be wandering around Europe? ...

Y took the approach that the simple and direct approach would not work. The total figure owed, $xyz billion, was too politically charged a number, particularly in [creditor A]. Tampering with it would inevitably lead to confrontation To challenge [creditor A] at this stage of the negotiations would bog them down in the sort of wrangling that has produced no results ... Instead, Y proposed that the committee focus on the very limited but achievable goal of reducing the amount [debtor] would have to pay in the immediate future to a more manageable level.

The committee would jettison the whole concept of "capacity to pay," he argued. It was impossible to know what this number was. Too many imponderables entered into the calculation, involving such questions as: How much could taxes be raised without triggering mass protest? How tightly could imports be squeezed without precipitating a collapse in production? How far could wages be reduced without provoking labor unrest? No one could agree on the answers to such cosmic questions. ...

In it's place, Y proposed an alternative criterion: the [debtor] public should be required to shoulder the same tax burden as [creditor] taxpayers. [Creditors] had to tap their tax revenues to pay interest on their own debts. [Debtors] had [devalued] away its internal public debt--the [debtor], therefore, had a natural surplus from which they could afford to pay their debt.

Friday, December 24, 2010

5 Unlikely and unexpected events that you should consider in 2011

I saw a few lists making the rounds of low-probability events that are generally unexpected as predictions of potential 2011 surprises. Here is my list of potential 2011 surprises:
  1. Increasing reserve requirements in China, in conjunction with excess lending in the last year and lower balances amongst household depositors as a result of negative real rates and increasing inflation expectations result in a sharp rise in interest rates as demand for credit increases and cheap deposits are scarce. Credit becomes difficult to obtain, causing the expansion to slow significantly.
  2. Credit crisis in Brazil. Attempts at controlling inflation by Dima Rousseff's new government lead to tightening and in the process expose massive overallocation of credit by the banking sector. Increasing rates make certain parties unable to refinance without sacrificing profitability or at all and a trigger wave of defaults as a result, particularly in consumer credit. Uncertainty spreads to other LatAm countries leading to significant losses in dollar and local currency-denominated debt.
  3. Q4 2010 Retail sales disappoint as increasing volumes are more than offset by margin compression as a result of online competition leading to very low net-income. Poor retail earnings releases kill sentiment and start a snowball that leads to a 20% sell-off in the S&P. Aggregate S&P earnings still increase, but PE compression stays and the S&P ends 2011 at 1150. 
  4. Lackluster global growth lead to Aussie property market weakness. EU banks dump Aussie MBS at steep losses to limit exposure, leading to continued weakness in the European banking sector and a new wave of Gov guarantees, further stressing sovereigns.
  5. An EU member state defaults after receiving aid from the EFSF. Resulting haircut severly impairs EFSF capital base. Member states, under obligation to make EFSF bondholders whole, suffer rating downgrades as a result of the liability (France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium) excluding Germany. The EFSF becomes uneconomical and is abandoned as the German public protests about the risk risking becoming a guarantor to an increasing number of EU member states.
Please understand this is all wild, wild speculation of technically possible yet very unlikely events. In particular #4 and #5. These things might happen, but they could take multiple years to play out.

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Someone at the BoJ doesn't quite grasp supply and demand

From Bloomberg:

Bank of Japan Pledges to Steadily Buy More Assets"...The BOJ’s purchases of real-estate investment trusts and exchange traded funds have bolstered stock prices, a sign the stimulus has supported sentiment even as global growth slows."
Uhm. I guess it's nice they are at least buying some hard-assets instead of government paper as far as the Yen is concerned, but someone ought to tell the peeps at the BoJ that if you have a stable, aging (and soon to be declining) population while you forbid foreigners from buying real-estate, chances are you are not going to have much luck supporting real-estate prices. Especially not when interest rates are already at record lows. It's that supply and demand thing you can learn from Mankiw's book.

My suggestion? Start letting immigrants in. Seriously.

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Just for fun: 2011 Predictions

Well, Bespoke got a cute little round-table thing going on and they forgot to consult me. It's OK, I'm used to it.

We'll review these again next year, along with a review of other people's too and see if the "wisdom of crowds" is for real. I suspect most of us will do no better than a dart-board.
  • Fed funds: Flat. Benny Bernanny wouldn't dare and he'll err in the inflation side, just like the  King of Knifecrime Island did. I truly believe he cares more about achieving full-employment than price stability and he his hell-bent on weakening the dollar, supporting asset prices and holding short-term real rates negative at all costs.
  • Dollar: Mixed, but generally flat. General downtrend with high spikes up if Portugal is forced to go to the EFSF or if haircuts for Euro debt happen, although I doubt that will happen. I haven't had a chance to update the maturity schedule for the PIIGS because, being unemployed, I can't afford decent health insurance, much less Bloomberg, but I'll try to sneak in somewhere when I get back home--currently on vacation
  • Long bond: Up. Right now I think it's oversold, but I could see it oscillating in this space, although I think the downtrend in interest rates is going to keep going (thank Europe!). The 2-30 curve is already at historical wides and I really don't see it getting much wider, especially because I think recovery hopes are a dash too high. In August I bet a trader at my old job that by next August we'd see the 2-30 spread around 200bp. In retrospect, that was too aggressive.
  • Munis: Definitely up. Conviction buy. In fact, if you follow me on twitter, you would have seen me ranting all last week about buying Munis and selling Tsys if you wanted to hedge the curve. Default fears are way overdone and I think that they are definitely undervalued on a relative basis. My preferred play here is lightly levered CEFs selling at a discount.
  • S&P: Up. I got my money on a range bound market with an upwards trend. Slower earnings growth. The story here is going to be multiples. I wouldn't be surprised to see PEG compression. So I think companies will be in better shape, but I think valuation won't keep up. Overall I like corp bonds, convertibles and HY (although I think upside here is limited). I think "Wall of Maturity" fears are way over-done. Best places to play are are CEFs with 20-40% of leverage and selling at decent discounts (> 7%). Good opportunities to trade in and out.
  • Light Vehicle Sales: 13.5M total, but steady and steep uptrend in SAAR. (Previously)
  • Euro crisis: Mostly unch. I expect upward creep on spreads. I think that the catalyst for Portugal to go to the EFSF is going to be really high rates on a refinance, not high rates on current-year deficit financing. 2012 is when I see that happening, the fund-raising necessary in 2011 is limited enough that Portugal could probably stomach the pain, so if they go to the EFSF it will be because of political pressure from peers to stop contagion fears and volatility, not market pressure. I think Italy is going to see the biggest widening (in % terms), followed by Spain. If Portugal front-loads and can pull-off a successful auction in Q1, I doubt anything drastic will happen.
  • UK: There is so much sad face to be had there. I expect continued weakness in the Sterling vs Euro combined with high inflation and a limited recovery. The VAT rise is fucking asinine. The only thing Brits are getting for Christmas is lowered standards of living. Banking exposure to Ireland is big and they still have their own housing issue to deal with. I see little probability of a recovery in UK housing and in fact expect significant further weakening. I wouldn't be surprised by additional write-downs, buuuut there is an upside. Banks that have deposits (liabilities) in Sterling and hold assets with Euro exposure will benefit from said weakness as losses in Euro denominated assets are partially offset by movement in the Sterling. I suspect this is deliberate.
  • Spain: Increase in spreads, banking problems no EFSF assistance necessary, but expect the FORB to get plenty of use.
  • Latin America: Continued boom. Inflation leading to central bank tightening will be a theme, at least in Brazil. Argentina up (PEOPLE ARE RETARDED!!!!). Increasing interest rates risk attracting more hot money and further aggravating the situation. Brazil's bond-tax was a great idea, in my opinion, I hope to see it elsewhere. I think the Automotive recovery will be a nice tailwind for Mexico. (I'll update with production graphs when I'm back home)
  • International Economics: I expect capital controls to be a continuing theme, particularly in the form of taxes similar to Brazil's. It makes perfect sense to me, curbing funding local assets with foreign liabilities and vice-versa will increase currency stability by creating "speed-humps" for capital and limiting the volatility caused by hot money flows.
  • China: Pettis already did it, so I'm not going to bother. My only prediction is continued inflation. Just look at the money supply growth. You can also look at all those Chinese IPOs happening recently. If that's not hot money, I don't know what is. Expect price inflation to lead to wage inflation which will lead to some exporters and manufacturing moving inland, South and possibly abroad. This is a good thing. Expansion outside of the currently-urbanized centers could maintain investment expenditure high, which would be good for nat. resource producers. The whole issue of Yuan appreciation might go away as a consequence of price inflation.
  • Housing: Mixed. Suburban McMansions down, multi-family up. Expect people to avoid big suburban houses in gated communities with expensive fees. Foreclosures will keep putting downward pressure on prices and there will be a lack of demand as people look for smaller, cheaper housing. Community Association fees got to outrageous levels and the upkeep on big houses is likely to be a deterrent to people in debt, or getting out of debt. Apartment rents up. I think a solid investment would be non-luxury condos to rent out. In South Florida, you could can definitely find properties that have positive carry. (rent > taxes + mortgage + fees).
We'll see how I fare next year!

Friday, December 17, 2010

Shut-up, TNR: Lady Liberty is a perky-titted, skinny chick with hairless labia

Outraged over their privacy being violated, The New Republic publishes a cover of an x-rayed Lady Liberty to show how our precious freedoms are being taken away. Normally, I'd be OK with their sensationalist outrage, buuuuut I was put on this earth to rain on your collective parades.

Not to get all Steinem/Levy on you, but I'm just kind of wondering, was it really necessary to use a skinny perky-titted model for this shoot? Also, I guess you can't blame TNR editors for not knowing much about physics, but I'd like to bring up the issue of hair. Normally, you can't see hair in x-ray images, but this image clearly shows Lady Liberty's nice 'do. Curiously, though, that's the only place where the Lady has hair. So, I'm left wondering whether seeing Lady Liberty go bald was so heinous that it had to be stopped, or whether outlined labia were acceptable for a magazine cover but pubic hair wasn't. Seriously guys, fuck you.