This bailout that looks like that bailout

In August 1998, the Chinese government issued bonds to recapitliase the big four banks.
The PBC first lowered the statutory reserve requirement ratio for the banking sector as a
whole from 13 per cent to 9 per cent, the MoF then issued RMB 270 billion (USD 33
billion)7 in special government bonds. The big four state-owned banks used the liquidity
freed up by the lowering of the reserve ratio to purchase the bonds. The government then
injected all the bond proceeds as equity into the big four banks (Mo, 1999), with the
consequence that the capital base of the big four banks more than doubled. As the initial
sole owner of the big four banks, the MoF thus met the capital call from these banks and
explicitly burdened future taxpayers to fund a capital injection.

Ma, Guonan. Who Pays  China's Bank Restructuring Bill. pg 14, CEPII Working Paper. February, 2006. Available at: http://www.cepii.net/anglaisgraph/workpap/pdf/2006/wp06-04.pdf

Two drunks holding each other up, anyone?

Walter, Carl E.; Fraser J. T. Howie (2011-01-19). Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China's Extraordinary Rise (Kindle Location 1069). John Wiley and Sons. Kindle Edition.

EDIT-1: For those of you who are missing the reference... Spain Weighs Injecting Debt Instead of Cash Into Bankia

How China's Negative Real Rates Depress Consumption

If you've ever caught me ranting about China on twitter, you've seen me carry on about how negative real deposit rates are an implicit transfer of wealth from households to government. You may also recognize that point from Michael Pettis' China Financial Markets blog. In this post I'm going to try to explain how this transfer works. It's not complicated, but if you don't understand how developing economies differ from economies like that of the US it can be hard to see the mechanism at work.


The basics:

• Outside the upper-middle and upper classes, consumer credit is not easily available in developing economies. You can't just call Experian and check someone's FICO. Large amounts of the population is unbanked, underbanked or has no credit history at all.
• The deposit and lending rate (and therefore the spread between them) are set by the central government.
• Michael Pettis has estimated real deposit rates are suppressed by "at least 400-600 basis points" (China Financial Markets)

Negative real deposit rates are a transfer of wealth from depositors and creditors to debtors
Because of the limited access to credit that households have, households are the main source of deposits in the system. Like in other developing and under-banked economies with limited access to consumer credit, in China you need to save money until you have the full price to pay for X good (e.g. durables) which, when combined with inflation, forces the households to accept negative real rates. Accepting a 2% yield when there's 5% inflation may mean -3% real rate, but it's better than the -5% cash yields. Reasons for savings include emergencies, possible medical expenses, savings for a home, vehicle purchase or a child's education or every-day cash management. Remember, the rest of the world doesn't use their Capital One to pay for their groceries. With this kind of saving pattern, real rates have inverse effects on saving because, the more negative real rates are, the higher the savings must be to achieve a savings goal or maintain the real value of the savings balance. Without access to credit, negative real deposit rates force the household sector to save more. Money channeled towards savings by the household sector is money that is not spent on consumption. An approximation of total tax on households--and consumption--would be the product of the average daily balance of total deposits multiplied by times the gap between market and government-set rates multiplied by the percentage of household deposits in the system. That estimate excludes any effect from misallocation of resources by borrowers.


Who are the creditors? Who is receiving the transfer?
In April 2009, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research published a paper which claims that state-owned enterprises (SOEs)--which account for about 37.6% of total value added in their respective industries and 25% of GDP--are only, or mostly, profitable due to a preferential cost of capital. According to the authors, "SOEs’ profits would have been entirely wiped out if SOEs were made to pay the same interest rates as otherwise equivalent private enterprises." How big is the problem? Well, "although SOEs’ contribution to the Chinese GDP was around 25%, they received about 65% of total loans."

Seeing as how a large portion of the SOE are involved in investment-related activities (in the GDP sense) and SOE's account for a majority of Chinese GDP the easy conclusion is that investment is being financed by taxing households through the banking sector. Net-winners? Anyone involved in that supply chain and the SOEs. So the transfer is moving from Households to government and business. Which businesses? Well, since, "about 41% of private enterprises have no access to credit and 56% have no access to bank credit," I'm going to guess big businesses.

Negative real rates impede a growth in household consumption by transferring wealth to government and business as long as households bear the cost of those negative real rates.

This leaves us with one way to increase consumption:

1. reduce the burden carried by households as a result of negative real rates.

And two possible ways of achieving that:

1. Raise real rates
2. Transfer some of the cost of negative real rates elsewhere

Barring a flood of foreign depositors itching to deposit funds into RMB-denominated accounts at negative real rates or holding RMB as FX reserves, option two means either government or business. Analyzing the effect to the SOEs is beyond the scope of this post, but since profits ultimately go back to the state, we can look at SOEs and government as one, and consider that subsidy as a tax. It's simply a way for the government to decide how citizens spend their own money. Unless the government stops trying to do that (fat chance), reduced subsidies to SOEs and government would just require more taxes/state-borrowing or less spending, of which the ultimate recipients are the household sector again.

Essentially, the other two beneficiaries of negative real rates, households and private industry with access to credit, are free-riding on this policy and benefiting from low-cost financing, creating a regressive re-distribution of household wealth. This is one of the many reasons we've seen restrictions, like higher down-payments, placed on mortgages of second and third home purchases.

Suggestions
The simplest fix to the problems caused by negative real rates (under-consumption, regressive redistribution, resource misallocation, asset-price inflation) is simply to raise real rates. Of course, raising real rates could cause a surge in NPLs from SOEs that wouldn't be profitable without the implicit subsidy. In the event of a SOE being rendered unprofitable by having to access capital at market rates, the implicit subsidy could simply be turned into an explicit one if the firm's activities were deemed important enough. Otherwise, the firm would go away or shrink, eliminating the dead-weight loss from misallocated resources. The banking system? The risk is already implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) socialized and the problem won't simply go away if Beijing keeps waiting.

Moving real interest rates up doesn't necessarily have to be contractionary for the economy. Sure, the loss of the implicit transfer from households to SOEs / Government would reduce investment capacity, but at the same time it would increase consumption capacity by an equal amount, although probably not the kind of consumption Beijing would prefer. Given the reduction in losses from negative real rates, households would be more able to absorb tax increases if Beijing wished to keep subsidizing investment.

Additionally, stepping closer towards market rates would allow the expansion of consumer credit. Widespread access to consumer credit wouldn't really co-exist well with real negative rates unless there was exterior financing, which would require major changes to the current account. Notwithstanding Q1 2010 numbers, I simply don't see consistent trade deficits for China in the horizon, so the next the easiest and healthiest road to increasing access to consumer credit is simply positive real rates.

Why increase access to consumer credit? In many ways--although not all--savings can be replaced by access to credit. Many people have savings so that they have enough purchasing capacity in short notice in case of an emergency. Credit can replace that cushion in many cases, reducing the need for short-term time or demand or deposits. Following this logic, giving someone access to credit allows them to spend deposits on consumption because the emergency purchasing power they needed is still there in the form of credit. Just this action, without any actual household borrowing, would shift some savings to consumption by reducing the quantity of household savings that need to be parked at deposit institutions.

China Money Supply: October 2010

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply

 

I was going to stop publishing these, but after looking at the blogger statistics, I noticed they were the most popular recurring item in terms of pageviews, so I decided to update them again. As always, the data is released in an unpredictable schedule--often late--so I can't predict when the next update will be.

You might notice that I changed the scale of the nominal graph to a log scale. It made sense. The only reason I hadn't done it before was because the formatting was poor, but I finally gave in and decided function was more important than form in this case.

China Money Supply: September 2010

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply

 

So here's a collection of updated charts with the latest money supply numbers from the People's Bank of China and the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Velocity of Money, YoY growth after the jump.

Please note that, purportedly because of demand for physical currency, there is a significant distortion around the Chinese New Year.

Nominal money supply numbers as reported by the People's Bank of China

China Money Supply: August 2010

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply

 

So here's a collection of updated charts with the latest money supply numbers from the People's Bank of China and the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Velocity of Money, YoY growth and some new GDP ones after the jump.

Please note that, purportedly because of demand for physical currency, there is a significant distortion around the Chinese New Year.

 

Nominal money supply numbers as reported by the People's Bank of China.

Indexed growth of the money supply compared to growth in GDP (2005=100)

Chinese Money Supply: June 2010 Reserves keep trending down, loans increase

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply

This is the latest money supply data from the People's Bank of China and China's National Bureau of Statistics. The English language version hasn't been updated in quite some time, but the Chinese-language version is regularly updated, although it seems like not in a normal schedule. As I've mentioned before, one of the requirements for a Chinese property bubble would be a large and rapid expansion of credit.

Please note that, purportedly because of demand for physical cash money, there is a significant distortion around the Chinese New Year.

As you can see in the first graph, the reserve rate keeps dropping, indicating an increase in loans, but the second graph shows us that, even if growth is still positive, it is at least no longer accelerating. This is what Pettis described as Beijing's stop-and-go measures in May of this year.

China: Exchange rates, productivity and inflation

Pettis writes today:

China is faced with a difficult policy choice. It can maintain an undervalued exchange rate, it can run the risk of inflation, or it can increase the domestic costs of financial repression. How Beijing balances these separate forces will determine the pace and form of its necessary rebalancing.

Which is much along the lines of what I wrote a couple of weeks ago. As always, I highly recommend reading all of Pettis' blog, which is very informative. What I found most interesting this time around was his discussion in inflation. In a closed economy, a rise in productivity increases the amount of goods provided, leading to price decreases as the number of good rises and the amount of money stays the same. In this scenario productivity increases and money supply growth can coexist and maintain price levels stable, even if a small amount of money is being printed.

China, bubbles, trade wars and balance of payments

Let's start with the alleged "property bubble," I still have doubts about that big crash coming, increases in property prices have been high, but accounts of high inflation would mean that catastrophic nominal price declines are doubtful. Property prices may lower or stagnate in real terms, but a high rate of inflation--which has its own, different problems--would keep nominal paper profits intact, reducing the risk of widespread loan defaults and huge banking losses that would lead to US-style crash and subsequent balance-sheet recession. Double digit inflation has its problems, but Latin American and other emerging economies have been doing it for many, many years, and they're OK--it's not catastrophic.

Putting aside events that have not happened yet, it's important to look at a bigger picture. As Pettis so eloquently put it last week:

5. If Europe’s current account surplus grows, there must be one or both of two automatic consequences.  Either the current account surplus of surplus countries like China and Japan must contract by the same amount, or the current account deficits of deficit countries like the US must grow by that amount, or some combination of the two.
6. If the Chinas and Japans of the world lower interest rates, slow credit contraction, and otherwise try to maintain their exports – let alone try to grow them – most of the adjustment burden will be shifted onto countries that do not intervene in trade directly.  The most obvious are current account deficit countries like the US.

What we are seeing here is a tough problem for China. On one side it needs to tighten to get a hold on on inflation and prevent potential asset-price bubbles but, on the other hand, doing so would transfer more of the global adjustment burden to itself, losing exports and hurting local businesses. If China decides to keep interest rates low to defend its exporters, potentially negative real interest rates would inevitably create mal-investment and fuel potential bubbles. If it doesn't, then it would risk a recession and widespread pain to its exporters as the result of drastic drops in imports by trade deficit countries as they try to curtail said deficits or even become net exporters. The money-supply data posted earlier is indicative that Chinese "tightening" still leaves pretty loose monetary policy. It really looks like China is in a real bind as a result of its unsustainable attempt to grow at the cost of other nations.

Pettis argues that because China has seen de facto revaluation as a result of the EURUSD drop, China could buy Euros, lots and lots of them, strengthening the Euro vs the Yuan. The problem I see, and Pettis describes, is that trade deficit countries are trying to lower their deficits or even become exporters, but too many people are trying to do the same thing at once, and China, the country with the largest trade surplus, doesn't want to give part of it up. The scary thing I see here is that depressing one's own currency is being seen as the key to exports and therefore prosperity, but if everyone is playing that game, what we'll be left with is a fiat-currency race to the bottom--something I hope never to see in my lifetime, as I don't like guns or canned food.

In my opinion, what China could to do is develop a larger domestic demand for its products. Playing a little game of this thing that looks like that thing, the current practice of exporting stuff and importing money seems a tad Mercantilist, in my opinion. Maybe instead of exporting stuff and importing money (debt, actually) they could import and export stuff. Or keep more of their goods at home, allowing for a larger accumulation of goods by the Chinese people--after all, value creation is not a zero-sum game. Moreover, I firmly believe that the people of China would be better served by working on their country instead of building us trinkets. By that, I mean that the marginal utility of undertakings like education (child and adult alike), immunization, water-treatment, waste disposal, infrastructure improvements and investments in whatever increases quality of life is higher than that of factory work making trinkets for sale in the US. Sometimes I really wonder if policymakers understand that the best and most sustainable path to increasing your wealth is not to take someone else's, it's to create your own.

Chinese money-supply April update

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply 

The Chinese money-supply data for April has been released. While it shows no further increases in the rate of growth, with YoY growth levels steady from March, it still shows significant expansion. The M1 measure showed a 31% YoY growth, a decline from its record-setting 39% in January, but still quite elevated; M2 growth dropped by 1% MoM to 21%, down 9% from its October record of 30%; M0 continued its increase at 16%; and the Money Multiplier increased 0.03 points to 5.9, an all-time high. The increasing MM is indicative of a continuing increase in lending, even as reserve-requirements increase (more below) and corroborates the "property bubble" story, but can not be considered evidence. What is clear from this is that there is still increasing demand for loans. While the numbers are nothing radically different from what we've seen in the last couple of months, the M0 growth is quite elevated and indicative of loose monetary policy, a little surprising considering the tightening--via reserve requirement increases--in January and February. It'll be interesting to see the May and June numbers considering the additional increase in reserve-requirements in May, as the numbers do indicate a heated economy.

Please note that, purportedly because of demand for physical cash money, there is a significant distortion around the Chinese New Year.

More on the Chinese real estate "bubble"

While reading the comments to M Pettis' excellent latest entry I spotted this:

The loan to value ratio has been between 10-20% from 2005 to 2008, it had increased to 46% in 2009 and further surged to 76% in 1Q10. (I used the incremental increase in mortgage loans from PBoC report and value of commercial residential transacted data from NBS ... I suspect the surge in loan in April further increases this leverage ratio.

I attribute this surge in leverage to two main reasons, 1) speculators have finally realized they can make a lot more $$ if they lever up and the common belief in China is that property prices will keep on going up ... Real demand is forced to lever to buy. To me, this is a sign of the upper bound of the affordibility. (sic)

Ding! ding! ding! If this man is really correct, those are some bubblicious circumstances. And if the LTVs are really as high as the upper 70s, well, 3 words: Balance-sheet recession. This should be really interesting. Outside of that whole thing, Pettis makes some excellent arguments and manages to concisely verbalize thoughts that I could spend hours rambling about and never really get across, so I'll just quote him:

For example, if RMB 100 is borrowed to build a railroad, the debt is sustainable if the railroad creates net economic value to China of RMB 100 or more.  If it doesn’t, the difference must be considered net debt that one way or another must be paid for by Chinese households.  This will of course reduce their future consumption along with the economic growth associated with satisfying that consumption.

Note that net economic value does not mean the total profits of the railroad generated by ticket revenues less operating costs.  We could begin with that number, but the value of the railroad would be increased by associated externalities – i.e. building the railroad might lower transportation costs for a number of businesses, allowing them to grow and to add economic value indirectly.  It would be reduced by certain opportunity costs, for example the alternative use of the land if it had a better use, or the negative impact it might have on the existing highway and airline infrastructure.

But most importantly it would be reduced by distortions in the financing cost.  For example, if the railroad were to be fully financed by 10-year bonds with interest rates 3 percentage points below the “natural” borrowing cost (a very low estimate), the economic value of the railroad would have to be reduced by RMB 19.

This amount is simply equal to the net present value of the hidden transfer from the lender to the borrower.  The fact that the borrower can obtain subsidized funds at an artificially low cost must represent a transfer of wealth from the providers of the funding, and this subsidy is a loss for the rest of the economy equal to the additional value for the entity being subsidized (another way of saying that there is no free lunch*).  By the way if the cost of funding is repressed by 6 percentage points, a perfectly plausible number, the net present value of the hidden subsidy is RMB 34.  These are not small numbers.

 I know that's long, but compared to how much he says, it's not a lot of words. This is the best summary of the problems of cheap credit I have EVER seen. And it's not only applicable to China, it applies to us too! Think about all  the artificially suppressed mortgage rates, the Fed and FDIC backing/guarantee programs, the whole issue of ZIRP etc. There's a ton of liquidity out there and it needs to go *somewhere*. If you lower rates enough, people will start investing in projects with negative NPVs. I know that doesn't make sense, but if you calculate the NPV as the present-value of the probability-adjusted payouts, one might go into a project with the odds against him because you can finance it with a loan, and if it goes bust you can just default. Which is really the problem with ZIRP, that it we end up investing in what essentially is a debt-financed call-option.

This kind of casino capitalism isn't going to get us anywhere. If we ever hope to get back to growth and increasing standards of living we can't all just sit around trading shit back and forth, we need to reduce our speculative activities and get back to funding and working on value creating processes.


PS: I find it fitting that Abnormal Returns (no link for them) linked to this same article when talking about the SSE performance. Way to miss the whole point, assholes. It's fitting that it's part of the "twit" network.

Chinese money-supply growth slows, reserves inch lower

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply
 
Hot on the heels of my complaint about the People's Bank of China not publishing money-supply statistics, the numbers have been published to their Chinese-language website, although still no 2010 data in the English-language version. It's becoming clear that there is evidence of overheating, although--as the second graph suggests--the government's efforts in slowing down growth have worked. In particular, the changes seen between Q1-2009 and Q2-2009 are indicative of overheating. Particularly notable, the M1 changes seen in the last 3 quarters signal the credit-expansion I was referring to last time I wrote about China.

The fact that M1 is still growing at an accelerating pace is worrysome. Just today, Bloomberg reported increasing inflation, hot on the heels of monetary tightening over the past couple of months. While this might sound counter-intuitive, it is well-covered by "Charles" on M Pettis' website. Part of his point being that when people are working towards a target sum by a certain date, lowering the discount rate will only serve to increase the savings rate as people have to make up lost interest income, or that when people have most of their savings in bank deposits instead of other assets, a decrease in the discount rate will have a negative wealth effect. That neat little digression aside, the point I am trying to make here is that these cultural differences in saving and spending behavior coupled with fears about declining purchasing-power of money could lead to an increasing demand for hard-assets, leading to additional upward pressure on prices.

For now, though,  I still think the Chinese "real-estate bubble" is a little too hyped up. Their banking rules require lower LTVs and their bank reserve-requirements are higher, making a US-style housing implosion unlikely. Asset prices may drop or stagnate, but I doubt a full-on implosion leading to a banking crisis is possible without the fuel provided by zero-downs, neg-ams etc. What I would love to see is some data as to what % of bank assets real-estate backed loans compromise and their average LTV. If one is to find evidence of a bubble or lack there-of, it'd be there.

The Possibility of a Chinese Propety Bubble and its Monetary Challenges

I have previously reported on the Chinese money-supply, but have not done so lately because the Peoples Bank of China has not reported money-supply information since January in their Chinese-language statistics page, and have not reported any statistics for 2010 in their English-language statistics page. This makes it exceptionally frustrating to hear about asset-price bubbles happening in the Chinese property market. Part of me really wants to believe the hype, because the increasing reserve requirements indicate monetary tightening and an attempt from the PBoC to cool down lending, but I would like some hard evidence.

As long as there is strong demand for funds by households or businesses, monetary tightening will raise interest rates, which should be able to cool down speculative activity. The problem here is that a globalized financial system means that rate increases could very well lead to large capital inflows as American, European and Japanese investors reach for yield since their respective central banks are keeping interest rates depressed. Compounding this problem is all the talk there has been about Yuan appreciation.

The reason that using rising rates to slow-down excessive speculation combined with expectations of a stronger Yuan is dangerous is that if low-interest rate country investors move money to China chasing yield, it will create added demand for the Yuan and excess supply for the home currency. In large enough quantities, this same pressure could put additional upward pressure on the Yuan compared to the Yen/Dollar/Euro. If the Chinese authorities crack to US pressure and allow appreciation of the Yuan, then this move up would only reinforce this behavior, creating a self-feedback loop, or, as it is otherwise known, a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is not an academic scenario, carry traders have systematically depressed the Yen and strengthened their target currencies for years with New Zealand being a prime example. If you are interested in the subject I highly recommend the last 3 chapters of The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics, Revised Edition: Lessons from Japans Great Recession.

Additionally, rising rates in China coupled with a strengthening currency would only serve to fuel an asset-price bubble, as money pouring into China seeks an asset to be parked in. If it's not foreign money, it could very well be local businesses borrowing abroad. I am not familiar with the specifics of the Chinese monetary policy, but depending on the amount of restriction there is with regards to borrowing abroad, it would be attractive for businesses to borrow at depressed rates in Japan or the US and use it to buy property in China. In addition to paying a lower interest-rate, Yuan appreciation would mean that dollar debts would be reduced in Yuan terms, driving the already low borrowing costs even lower, reducing the cost of carry and driving ever more speculative investment. This could continue until the PBoC either succeeds in cooling down a booming property market or the whole thing collapses onto itself. While the first option could create a small garden-variety recession, the second option would create huge losses to the people of China, create a violent swing in the exchange rate and push china into a balance-sheet recession.

If the MSM writings on China are correct and businesses are making speculative property investments with borrowed money, this has the potential to be a giant balance sheet recession in the making; however, if the purchases are not significantly leveraged, losses are likely to be absorbed by owner equity instead of a US-style housing bust where NPLs quickly spread to banking system and lead to a credit crunch and full-on systemic crisis.

Until I can find official numbers on the amount of real-estate financed with debt, I won't know if there really is a Chinese real-estate bubble or the magnitude of it. Until then, though, I will keep watching both the moves of the PBoC and Yuan for clues as to the presence of a bubble. A refusal of the Chinese authorities to allow Yuan appreciation wouldn't necessarily be a case of "mercantilist" policies or export subsidy as much as it could be the Chinese trying to prevent further asset-price increases resulting from capital inflows.

Chinese Money Supply: Record Low Reserves (17%)

To see the latest data please see the label Chinese Money Supply

Note that the numbers available from the PBC only go from Jan2004-Dec 2009. As soon as the 2010 numbers are available I'll post an update. Also, if you are perplexed by that spike in reserves, there is a very simple explanation: Chinese New Year.

Traditionally, Red envelopes or red packets ... are passed out during the Chinese New Year's celebrations, from married couples or the elderly to unmarried juniors ... Red packets almost always contain money, usually varying from a couple of dollars to several hundred.

Wikipedia: Chinese New Year

Chinese Money Supply

When China announced on January 12, 2010 that they were going to raise reserve requirements by 50 basis points everyone broke out in a panic about it. People speculated there would be crashes, that that there was a crazy China bubble or that the Chinese banks were driving asset-price bubbles through insane leverage. While the Chines Money Supply has indeed been growing faster than before as of late, that makes sense. Last year assets were depressed, leaving room for upside, and credit was hard to get. The Chinese central bank dropped reserve requirements by 50 basis points, which encouraged lending. As things settled down people resumed lending and borrowing. Nothing really crazy is going on. If you are part of the Minsky club, like I am, you consider a significant credit boom an essential part of a bubble. So, let's see if there really is some crazy Chinese bubble or if the Central Bank was just returning things to normal.
Please also note how high their reserves are. American banks keep only 10% of reserves on their transaction deposits (checking accounts). Savings accounts, and CDs are time deposits and have no mandated reserve requirement. Do your homework people. It's not that hard.
Sources:
People's Bank of China
Reserve Requirements (NY Fed)